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All of the parties to this appeal are listed in the 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has j u r i sd i c t i on pursuarit to Ar t i c le VIII , 
Section 3 of the Const i tut ion of Utah and Utiah Code Ann, 
§ 78-2-(3)(b) (1987, as amended). 
C0UNTER-8TATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I . Did the t r i a l court properly conclude t ha t the value 
of property in a condemnation act ion was enhanced by 
i t s proximity to an a i rpor t constructed following a 
separate condemnation proceeding eleven years 
e a r l i e r . This issue i s subject to review under the 
"c lea r ly erroneous" standard of Utjah R. Civ. P. 
52(a) .x 
I I . Did the t r i a l court properly admit^ into evidence the 
appraisal of J . Phi l ip Cook and finding tha t t h i s 
appraisal provided the best estimate of the value of 
the condemned property. This issiie i s reviewable for 
abuse of d i sc re t ion . 2 
Whether a condemnee is en t i t l ed to recover the value of his property as 
enhanced by a pr ior condemnation and development of adjacent property 
depends on whether the second taking is within jthe scope of the 
or iginal government project . United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 
376-77 (1943). Whether the second taking is within the scope of the 
or iginal project presents a question of fact . Mobile Co. v. Brantly, 
507 So. 2d 483, 486 (Ala. 1987). Questions of fact are subject to 
review under the "clearly erroneous" standard, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), 
and must remain undisturbed unless "the reviewing court on the ent i re 
evidence i s l e f t with the defini te and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemmer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 
(1985) (quoting, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948)); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
The t r i a l cour t ' s rulings regarding the admissibi l i ty and weight of J . 
Phil ip Cook's expert opinion are reviewable orjly for an abuse of 
d iscre t ion. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 
1984). Under th i s standard, a reviewing court wil l not upset the 
judgment of the t r i a l court unless the t r i a l court "acted in excess of 
i t s authori ty or in a manner so c lear ly outside reason that i t s action 
must be deemed capricious and a rb i t ra ry . " Pe^tross v. Board of 
Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976). 
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I I I . Whether the t r i a l court erred in using an option 
agreement to determine the cost of acquiring needed 
access to the condemned property. This issue i s 
reviewable de novo.2, 
IV. Whether the t r i a l court erroneously refused to award 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and appraisa l cos ts based on the bad 
fa i th conduct of the P la in t i f f -Appel lan t . While the 
award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees i s general ly reviewable only 
for abuse of d i sc re t ion , t h i s issue a lso presents a 
question of s t a tu to ry construct ion reviewable de novo 
by the Court.4 
STATUTE8 INVOLVED 
The t e x t of the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-12-1 e t seq. (1987, as amended), i s attached as 
Addendum A to t h i s b r ie f . 
The t e x t of the Federal Uniform Real Property 
Acquisi t ion Policy, 42 U.S.C. § 4651 e t seq. (1989), i s 
at tached as Addendum B. 
Because an option agreement i s inadmissible evidence of market value as 
a matter of law, United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 
1966), the t r i a l court ' s dec i s ion to use an option agreement to 
determine the value of adjoining land needed to access the condemned 
property i s reviewable for l ega l error. 
The t r i a l court ' s dec i s ion to refuse an award of a t torney 's fees and 
appraisal co s t s based on the condemnor's bad f a i t h conduct i s 
reviewable for an abuse of d i s cre t ion . Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989). However, included in the t r i a l court ' s 
dec i s ion to refuse an award of at torney's fees and appraisal cos t s i s 
i t s conclusion that the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-12-1 e t seq. (1987, as amended), and the Federal Uniform Real 
Property Acquis i t ion P o l i c i e s , 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4651-55 (Law. Co-op. 
1989), do not apply to t h i s case . This presents a question of 
s tatutory interpretat ion . As the ult imate authority responsible for 
interpret ing l e g i s l a t i v e enactments, t h i s Court appl ies a "correction 
of error" or de novo standard of review to questions of s tatutory 
construct ion. Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 
P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1990). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987, as amended), 
provides in relevant part: 
In civil actions, the court shall ^ward 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action wa^ without 
merit and not brought or asserted i[n good 
faith. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant Board of County Commissioners of 
Tooele County (the "County") filed this condemnation action 
against Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant Joseph Wiley 
Ferrebee as trustee of the Ferrebee 1976 Family Trust 
("Ferrebee") on May 16, 1986. Record (hereinafter "R.") 6. 
The County sought to condemn 43.66 acres of Ferrebee's 
property (the "subject property") in order to expand the 
Tooele County Airport from its original siie when completed in 
1976. After filing its complaint, the County received an 
order of immediate occupancy and the propeirty was transferred 
I 
to the county to begin construction. R. 2D. 
At trial the parties contested thje valuation of the 
condemned property and each put on expert evidence of the 
property's value. Ferrebee also presente4 evidence of the 
County's non-compliance with the procedural requirements 
mandated by the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 57-12-1 et seq. (1987, as amended) (Addendum A), and the 
Federal Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy, 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 4651 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1989) (Addendum B). Ferrebee also 
presented evidence of the County's bad faith in bringing and 
prosecuting this action. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court entered a ruling in favor of Ferrebee 
on August 29, 1989, after completion of a four-day bench 
trial. R. 431. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered on April 30, 1990. R. 413 (Addendum C to this brief). 
Final Judgment was entered on June 14, 1990. R. 415 (Addendum 
D to this brief). The County filed a notice of appeal on July 
6, 1990, R. 420, and Ferrebee filed a notice of cross-appeal 
on July 17, 1990. R. 424. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court found that the County had initiated a 
condemnation action in 1975 to obtain approximately 37 acres 
of Ferrebee's 80-acre parcel of property in order to construct 
the Tooele County Airport. R. 412. On May 16, 1986, over 
eleven years after the earlier proceeding, this condemnation 
action against Ferrebee's remaining 43.66 acres was initiated. 
The court made a factual finding that this 1986 condemnation 
action was "a complete and separate action from the 1975 
condemnation." R. 412. 
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The trial court rejected the County's appraisals 
because, among other reasons, they were basefr upon comparables 
from depressed sales which were not competently adjusted. R. 
411. The court found the appraisal of J. Philip Cook to be 
the best estimate of the property's fair marfket value. R. 
411. Consistent with the Cook appraisal, the court determined 
that the base agricultural value of the property was $52,000. 
R. 411, Exhibit 91 at 44. The court noted that Ferrebee had 
an option to acquire a narrow strip of land,needed to access 
the subject property, which had become landlocked after the 
1975 condemnation, for the market value of $500 per acre. R. 
411. This adjoining access property was owhed by a long-time 
friend and tenant of Ferrebee's property, Flloyd Walters. 
However, based upon an unexercised option Pjerrebee had 
subsequently obtained from Walters to acquire the access 
property for $5,000 per acre, the court decocted $19,240 from 
the $52,000 base value of the property as $n access 
adjustment. R. 410. 
After deducting access costs, the trial court then 
added $40,950 (125% of the reduced base agricultural value) as 
an enhancement for the property's increaseji value due to its 
proximity to the airport. R. 410. This enhancement was based 
I 
on comparable sales of land adjacent to otiier rural airports. 
R. 410. This resulted in a total fair market value figure of 
$74,000. R. 410. The trial court ordere4 an award of this 
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amount, less the County's payment of $9,004.87 already 
deposited with the court, plus interest. R. 414. The trial 
court also awarded $826.31 in property taxes paid by Ferrebee 
and $307.32 in costs. R. 414. 
With regard to the state and federal relocation acts, 
the court found that the County did not comply with the 
procedures therein mandated in that the County (1) failed to 
act expeditiously to acquire the subject property by 
negotiations, (2) failed to notify Ferrebee that the County 
was having the subject property appraised, (3) failed to allow 
Ferrebee to accompany the County's appraiser during his 
inspection, (4) failed to offer Ferrebee the lowest appraisal 
amount for the purchase of the subject property and (5) failed 
to disclose to Ferrebee the basis for the dollar amount used 
by the County in negotiations with Ferrebee. R. 411-12. The 
trial court ruled, however, that the state and federal 
relocation acts do not apply to this case. R. 411-412. The 
factual findings listed above were made by the court to avoid 
the necessity of a remand in the event the acts are determined 
to apply on appeal. 
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C0UNTER-8TATEMENT OF FACT8 
The County's statement fails to convey accurately the 
factual matters most relevant to the disposition of this 
appeal and cross-appeal. Ferrebee, therefore, submits this 
counter-statement. 
A project to develop the Tooele Coijinty Airport was 
originally conceived in the late 1960's. R[ 435 at 18. The 
final plans adopted by the County required the use of 37 acres 
of an 80-acre parcel owned by Ferrebee. In February 1975, the 
County condemned approximately 37 acres of [Ferrebee's land. 
R. 435 at 123. The 1975 taking was concluded by jury verdict 
in May 1979. R. 188. Immediately after these proceedings 
concluded, Ferrebee was approached by a county official, 
Commissioner Buzianis, who expressed an interest in 
participating with Ferrebee in the commercial development of 
the remaining property. R. 439 at 814-15. Commissioner 
Buzianis remarked that Ferrebee's remaining parcel was very 
valuable. Id. 
As a result of the County's 1975 taking, the 
remaining 43.66 acres of Ferrebee's parcelI 
However, Floyd Walters, a long-time friend) 
tenant of Ferrebee's property owned an adj 
promised Ferrebee free use of his property 
I 
remaining landlocked parcel. R. 439 at 657-659. Walters also 
granted Ferrebee an option to obtain access for fair market 
were landlocked, 
of Ferrebee and 
fining parcel and 
to access the 
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value (estimated at $500 per acre) and, short ly before the 
present condemnation proceeding began, granted a second option 
to obtain access for $5,000 per acre . Both opt ions were in 
e f f e c t at the time of t r i a l , 5 
In May of 1981, a Metropolitan Air Systems Plan for 
the S a l t Lake City/Provo/Ogden area was formally proposed by 
the Wasatch Front Regional Counsel on Aviation and the 
Mountain Lands Associat ion of Governments. R. 435 at 38. 
This plan recommended substant ia l changes t o and expansion of 
the Tooele Val ley a irport as a means of meeting the demands of 
the increas ing volume of Wasatch Front a i r t r a f f i c . 
The County thereaf ter created a Master Plan Task 
Force in 1982. That task force u l t imate ly re jec ted the 
Metropolitan Air Systems Plan proposal and, a f t e r evaluat ing 
severa l other p lans , commenced work on developing the Tooele 
County Bolinder Fie ld Master Plan (master plan) for expansion 
of the a i rpor t . R. 435 at 47, 134, 260. The master plan 
ant i c ipated the Tooele a i r p o r t ' s s t a t u s as a r e l i e v e r a irport 
for the S a l t Lake Internat ional Airport and c a l l e d for 
The $500 per acre option was granted in 1979. R. 439 at 660. Although 
t h i s wri t ten option expired in December 1981, Walters and Ferrebee 
agreed that the parcel described in the option would remain avai lable 
for purchase at market value at any time. R. 439 at 658-63. In April 
1986, when condemnation of the subject property appeared imminent, 
Ferrebee, at the in s i s t ence of h i s attorney, entered into the $5,000 
per acre option. R. 439 at 665-66. Walters t e s t i f i e d that t h i s 1986 
option agreement did not suspend operation of h i s prior informal, $500 
per acre agreement with Ferrebee. R. 439 at 665-66. 
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significant expansion. R. 435 at 134. The County's master 
plan was approved by the county commission 4nd t h e planning 
commission in the spring of 1986. R. 435 at 52. In order to 
implement its adopted master plan, the County passed a 
resolution to condemn the remaining 43.66 aires of Ferrebee's 
property on April 22, 1986. R. 435 at 261-62. 
Following the promulgation of the May 1981 
Metropolitan Air Systems Plan, and anticipating the need to 
acquire at least part of Ferrebee's remaining parcel, the 
County mentioned to Ferrebee in September 1981 that it had an 
interest in acquiring an additional portion) of his property. 
R. 439 at 817. Thereafter, the County conducted two 
appraisals. In November 1981, the County commissioned Jerry 
R. Webber to appraise approximately 16 acres of Ferrebee's 
remaining parcel. R. 437 at 321-22. Mr. Webber's 1981 
appraisal concluded that the fair market value of Ferrebee's 
property was $1,750 per acre. R. 437 at 3^7, Exhibit 4 at 14. 
In December 1981 the County ordered a secohd appraisal of the 
same 16 acres of Ferrebee's parcel by William L. Allsop. R. 
435 at 192; R. 440 at 891. Mr. Allsop's appraisal concluded 
that the property was worth $4,500 per acrb. R. 440 at 891, 
Exhibit 65 at 5. Neither the Webber nor t^ he Allsop appraisal 
allowed for an enhancement based on the siibject property's 
proximity to the airport. The County's 1981 appraisals and 
-9-
discussions with Ferrebee did not result in a formal offer to 
purchase any portion of the Ferrebee property. 
In September 1983 the County applied for a federal 
assistance grant through the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) for money to fund the airport expansion project. The 
County's application budgeted $1,750 per acre to acquire the 
subject property as set forth in the 1981 appraisal by Mr. 
Webber. R. 435 at 231-32. In connection with its efforts to 
obtain federal funding, the County provided written assurance 
to the FAA that it would comply with the Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal 
and Federally Assisted Programs. R. 437 at 208-09; Exhibit 
51; R. 437 at 236. 
In February of 1985, the County commissioned Mr. 
Webber to appraise the subject property so that a more recent 
appraisal could be furnished to the FAA in connection with the 
County's application for federal funding. R. 437 at 101, 349. 
Contrary to the state and federal real property acquisition 
policies, Ferrebee was neither invited to accompany Webber 
while performing the 1985 appraisal nor was he informed that 
the appraisal had been ordered. R. 437 at 383. Mr. Webber's 
1985 appraisal was based on comparables furnished by the 
County and on comparables from a large scale liquidation of 
property by Leucadia National Corporation d/b/a Terracor (the 
Terracor Sales). R. 435 at 213; R. 437 at 455. The Terracor 
-10-
sales involved the liquidation of over 1,00Q acres of property 
in the relevant area between mid-1983 and 1^85. R. 437 at 
422. These properties were sold by Terracor at a loss. R. 
437 at 455. Additionally, Webber's 1985 appraisal did not 
I 
consider the availability of water on the subject property, R. 
437 at 440, nor did the appraisal use comparables adjacent to 
rural airports. R. 437 at 448. Mr. Webber's 1985 appraisal 
resulted in a valuation of only $275 per acre — an 85% 
decrease from his 1981 appraisal. R. 435 at 215, Exhibit 11 
at 15. 
The drastic contrast between Mr. Webber's 1981 and 
i 
1985 appraisals necessitated that the County order a review of 
Webber's 1985 appraisal by George Y. Fugii. R. 437 at 479-80. 
Mr. Fugii refused to defend Webber's 1985 appraisal and 
levelled abundant and penetrating criticism against it. 
Exhibit 15. An important criticism was th£t the 1985 Webber 
appraisal relied heavily on the Terracor sales, R. 4 38 at 588, 
at a time when "Terracor was trying to sell out." R. 438 at 
590. Mr. Fugii criticized Webber's conclusion that the 
highest and best use of the property was for agricultural 
I 
purposes because the appraisal offered no support for the 
conclusion. Exhibit 15 at 2. Additionally, Mr. Fugii noted 
that Webber's appraisal failed to provide any supporting data 
to substantiate the appraisal's 50% downward adjustment for 
the landlocked condition of the subject property. R. 437 at 
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388. Mr. Fugii ultimately concluded that Mr. Webber "[was] 
not qualified to make this type of appraisal." R. 438 at 566, 
Exhibit 15 at 3. 
In March 1986, more than four years after the County 
first appraised the subject property, the County communicated 
its first formal offer in writing to acquire Ferrebee's 
property. R. 435 at 246; Exhibit 12. At the time of the 
offer, the County had received appraisals of $1,750 per acre 
(the Webber 1981 appraisal), $4,500 per acre (the 1981 Allsop 
Appraisal) and a $275 per acre appraisal which had been 
totally discredited by Mr. Fugii. In spite of the foregoing, 
the County offered Ferrebee only $275 per acre for his 
property plus a $200 per acre "incentive" to avoid litigation. 
R. 435 at 109, 247. Additionally, after waiting well over 
four years to make an offer of purchase, the County demanded a 
response within two weeks. R. 435 at 248. Mr. Ferrebee 
rejected the County's offer of purchase. 
In preparation for litigation, Mr. Fugii was retained 
by the County's attorney to perform his own appraisal of the 
subject property. R. 437 at 492. In spite of his sharp 
criticism of the Webber appraisal for its reliance on the 
Terracor liquidation sales, eight of the ten comparables used 
by Mr. Fugii were Terracor liquidations. Exhibit 17 at 15-18. 
Mr. Fugii testified that these comparables were used because 
there were few other comparables available. R. 437 at 502; R. 
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439 at 626. The property's proximity to th^ airport did not 
influence Mr. Fugii's valuation and comparables adjacent to 
rural airport property were not used in his appraisal. R. 4 38 
at 601-02. Fugii deducted 65% of his computed value of the 
subject property as the cost of acquiring access to arrive at 
i 
a valuat ion of only $240 per acre. Exhibit '17 at 24. 
At t r i a l , the t r i a l court received) the appraisals of 
two experts obtained by Mr. Ferrebee as evidence of the 
subject property's value . Ph i l ip A. Snel l determined the 
value of the subject property to be $2,270 per acre. Exhibit 
23 at i v . 6 Mr. Snel l concluded that the h ighest and best use 
of the property would "be a use that would take advantage of 
the unique loca t ion adjacent to the Tooele |Valley Airport ." 
Exhibit 23 at 13; R. 439 at 709. Reasoning from h i s expert 
experience that d i s t r e s s e d s a l e s are t y p i c a l l y discounted from 
25% t o 35%, Mr. Snel l adjusted the value o^ the 15 Terracor 
i 
s a l e s used as comparables in h i s appraisal I by 30%. Exhibit 
23 at 23. Mr. S n e l l # s ana lys i s a l s o included 13 comparables 
of vacant propert ies near a irports in ruraJL loca t ions acquired 
Mr. Snel l prepared two appraisals , one in Aprilj of 1986 and a second 
appraisal in March of 1989. R. 439 at 700-04. iThe f i r s t appraisal 
concluded that the value of the property was $85,000 or approximately 
$1,946 per acre. R. 439 at 703. Mr. Snell performed the second 
appraisal af ter finding fau l t with h i s f i r s t appraisa l ' s fa i lure to 
evaluate the property's potent ia l use in connection with the needed 
expansion of the a irport . R. 439 at 709. Mr. Snel l intended h i s 
second appraisal to supersede the f i r s t as his | expert opinion of the 
subject property's value. R. 439 at 707. 
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either for airport expansion or airport-related commercial 
usage, R. 439 at 712; Exhibit 23 at 21. Information on these 
comparables was obtained by consulting with other expert 
appraisers, real estate agents and airport consultants. 
Exhibit 23 at 15. These properties showed an increase in 
value due to the airport's influence ranging from 18% to 370%. 
R. 439 at 713-14.7 After determining the property's base 
value to be $1,153 per acre, Mr. Snell applied a conservative 
100% adjustment as an enhancement for the property's proximity 
to the airport and arrived at a value of $2,306 per acre. R. 
439 at 719, Exhibit 23. 
The appraisal determined by the court to provide the 
most accurate assessment of the subject property's fair market 
value was performed by J. Philip Cook in July of 1989. R. 434 
at 9, Exhibit 91. For his appraisal Mr. Cook acquired 
regional social, economic, environmental and governmental 
information and contacted the County concerning zoning, taxes 
and availability of utilities. R. 434 at 8. After thoroughly 
analyzing the feasible physical, legal and economic uses of 
the subject property, Mr. Cook concluded that the "[h]ighest 
present land value is obtained by agricultural uses on an 
Mr. Snell's computation of the base value of the subject property did 
not include an upward adjustment for the water availability because the 
highest and best use of the property in connection with commercial or 
industrial activity rendered irrigation unimportant. R. 439 at 798. 
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interim basis, with the potential for future uses in 
conjunction with the airport." Exhibit 91 at 25-29. 
Mr. Cook computed the agricultural base value of the 
land by using comparables from the period 1983-1986. R. 434 
at 14. Terracor sales used as comparables were adjusted by a 
nature of the 
Cook's computation 
very conservative 10% due to the distressed 
sales. R. 434 at 18-19; Exhibit 91 at 35. 
of the subject property's base value also included an analysis 
of the property's water availability. R. 4J4 at 26. In 
addition, Mr. Cook applied a large 37% downward adjustment for 
the landlocked condition of the property, K. 434 at 33. 
Applying these considerations, Mr. Cook determined the value 
of the property to be $750 per acre. Exhibit 91 at 40. 
Mr. Cook then considered any property value 
enhancement attributable to the subject property's proximity 
to the airport. For this purpose, Mr. COOK verified sales of 
six agricultural properties adjacent to basic utility airports 
in rural communities. Exhibit 91 at 43. Of these six 
comparables, two were court ordered condemnation awards and 
were thus given less weight by Mr. Cook, even though the 
premiums paid in those sales were similar to negotiated 
transactions. Exhibit 91 at 43. These comparables indicated 
an airport proximity enhancement factor of 
Exhibit 91 at 44. Mr. Cook selected a conservative 
enhancement factor of 125% and applied this to the base 
22% to 369%. 
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agricultural value less the cost of access. R. 434 at 42; 
Exhibit 91 at 44. This resulted in an ultimate valuation of 
$74,000 or approximately $1,695 per acre. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The County asserts that the trial court/s judgment 
must be reversed for three interrelated reasons. First, 
Ferrebee ostensibly did not "carry his burden" of 
demonstrating that he is entitled to an enhanced value for the 
subject property. App. Br. 15. Second, the County asserts 
that, as a matter of law, no enhanced value can be awarded for 
the subject property's proximity to the airport. Id. at 15-
16. Third, the County claims that the trial court's decision 
is based on incompetent and inadmissible evidence. Id. at 16. 
None of these submissions merit reversal. 
To begin with, the County's second argument — i.e., 
that the trial court's award of an enhanced value is legally 
flawed — itself rests upon a serious distortion of applicable 
law. An owner of property condemned for public use is 
entitled to any enhanced value of the property flowing from 
prior condemnation proceedings so long as the present 
condemnation action is separate and distinct from the prior 
government development. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 
14 (1970); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). 
Here, the trial court specifically found that this 
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condemnation action was "a complete and separate action from 
the 1975 condemnation.1' R. 412. This factual finding is not 
clearly erroneous and, therefore, must be affirmed by this 
Court. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Because Ferrebee is legally entitled to the enhanced 
value he sought for his property, the County's first and third :yJ 
Cook appraisal 
submissions (i.e., that Ferrebee did not factually support his 
valuation claim and/or supported it with inadmissible 
evidence) fall like a house of cards. The prial court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
represented the best evidence of the subject property's value. 
That appraisal carefully examined all factors necessary to an 
appropriate determination of value, including the feasible 
physical, legal and economic uses of the property. The 
County's objections regarding the "admissibility" of the Cook 
appraisal, moreover, are misplaced. An expert's opinion may 
be partially based on inadmissible evidence — so long as such 
evidence is the type reasonably relied upon by experts in a 
given field. Utah R. Evid. 703. Mr. Cookrs appraisal plainly 
meets that standard. Thus, the errors assorted by the County 
are without substance. 
The trial court, however, did errl in two respects. 
The court deducted $19,240 from the base agricultural value of 
the land as the cost of obtaining access to the property. 
This calculation was based on a $5,000 perf acre option 
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agreement between Ferrebee and his adjoining tenant, rather 
than upon the actual fair market cost of obtaining access for 
which Ferrebee also held an opinion. This is clear error. An 
option contract, because of its inherent uncertainty, is 
inadmissible as a matter of law and irrelevant to issue of 
fair market value. United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807, 811 
(5th Cir. 1966). As a result, the cost of access to the 
property should be based on fair market value — not on the 
speculative and inflated option price. 
Finally, the court erred in failing to award 
attorneys' fees and appraisal costs to Ferrebee. Attorney's 
fees and appraisal costs are properly awardable under general 
equitable principals and required to be awarded under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987, as amended). The County's failure 
to comply with the provisions of the Federal Uniform Real 
Property Acquisition Policies and the Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act — despite its agreement to the contrary with 
the FAA — evidences the County's bad faith. Indeed, the 
actions of the County here demonstrate abusive, heavy-handed 
treatment and complete disregard of the legitimate rights and 
interests of property owners and merit the imposition of costs 




I. Ferrebee Is Entitled To The Enhanced Value Of His 
Property Stemming Prom The Original Airport Project 
Because This Condemnation Is A Separate And Unrelated 
Proceeding Necessitated By The Airport's 
Unanticipated Expansion 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), 
I 
prescribes the dispositive test to determine whether a 
condemnee is entitled to receive the value cj>f his property as 
enhanced by previous government development 
lands. The Miller test provides: 
of adjoining 
If a distinct tract is condemned, in 
whole or in part, other lands in tljie 
neighborhood may increase in market value due 
to the proximity of the public improvement 
erected on the land taken. Should)the 
Government, at a later date, determine to 
take these other lands, it must pay their 
market value as enhanced by this factor of 
proximity. If, however, the public project 
from the beginning included the taking of 
certain tracts, but only one of thpm is taken 
in the first instance, the owner olf the other 
tracts should not be allowed an increased 
value for his lands. . . 
The question is whether the Respondents' 
lands were probably within the scope of the 
project from the time the Government was 
committed to it. If they were not, but were 
merely adjacent lands, the subsequent 
enlargement of the project to include them 
ought not deprive the respondents of the 
value added in the meantime by th^ proximity 
of the improvement. 
Miller, 317 U.S. at 376-77. 
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This test was reaffirmed by Supreme Court 21 years 
after Miller in United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970), 
in which the Court stated: 
[T]he development of a public project may also 
lead to enhancement in the market value of 
neighboring land that is not covered by the 
project itself. And if that land is later 
condemned, whether for an extension of the 
existing project or for some other public 
purpose, the general rule of just compensation 
requires that such enhancement in value be 
wholly taken into account, since fair market 
value is generally to be determined with due 
consideration of all available economic uses 
of the property at the time of the taking. 
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis supplied). 
Whether a second taking is within the scope of the 
original project for purposes of applying Miller is to be 
answered by determining the reasonable expectation of the 
ordinary land owner. United States v. Eastman, 714 F.2d 76, 77 
(9th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. 65.0 Acres of Land, 
728 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir. 1984). Additionally, even when 
the subject property is initially within the scope of the 
original project, the government must pay enhanced value when 
subsequent government action creates a reasonable belief on 
the part of the landowner that his property has been removed 
from the original project's scope. 65.0 Acres of Land, 728 
F.2d at 420; United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 669 F.2d 
1364, 1367 (10th Cir. 1982). 
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Whether the subject property is witjhin the scope of 
the original project presents a question of (fact. Mobile Co. 
v. Brantly, 507 So, 2d 483, 486 (Ala, 1987). Likewise, the 
reasonable expectation of the landowner is ai factual issue. 
Eastman, 714 F.2d at 77. In the instant case, the trial court 
made a factual determination that "[t]he 1986 condemnation was 
a complete and separate action from the 1975 condemnation." 
R. 412. This factual determination may be reversed only if 
"clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)? State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Application of the law to the 
facts of this case shows that the trial court's valuation was 
clearly correct. 
When the County prepared preliminary airport plans in 
the early 1970's, it briefly considered a more expansive 
condemnation project which would have included most of 
Ferrebee's 80-acre parcel; however, the original airport plan 
actually implemented by the County necessitated the 
condemned in 1975. 
ion of the airport 
additional land was 
acquisition of only the 37 acres that were 
During the course of planning and construct^ 
under the original plan the acquisition of 
not contemplated. In fact, there is no evidence in the record 
that the County anticipated the need for airport expansion 
until 1980 when aviation studies suggested the future need for 
the Tooele Valley Airport to relieve the Silt Lake 
International Airport of some of its air traffic. 
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The County, of course, makes much of the fact that 
Ferrebee was contacted in September 1981 regarding acquisition 
of his property. App. Br. 4. This contact, however, does not 
show that Ferrebee had any "reasonable expectation" in 1975 — 
at the outset of the original proceeding — that his property 
would once again be subject to condemnation. To the contrary 
the record demonstrates that Ferrebee had no such expectation 
until five years later when the 1980 aviation studies were 
prepared. A property owner certainly cannot be required to 
anticipate government action which the government itself did 
not anticipate; to rule otherwise would ignore the distinction 
between "reasonable expectation" and clairvoyance. Nor can 
the County claim that the subject property was within the 
scope of the original project based on an abandoned 
preliminary plan to obtain up to all of Ferrebee's property. 
The County cannot reasonably be heard to contend that Ferrebee 
must have reasonably expected that the County would condemn 
his remaining property 11 years after the first taking when 
the airport as originally planned and constructed required 
none of Ferrebee's property beyond the 37 acres taken in 1975. 
The County's statement in its opening brief that it 
took only 37 acres of Ferrebee's 80 acre parcel in 1975 
because of "budgetary restraints" is wholly unsupported by the 
record. App. Br. 4. Moreover, the County would have been 
constitutionally forbidden from taking more property than the 
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37 acres needed to construct the airport as designed in the 
adopted final plans. While state and federal constitutions 
permit private property to be taken for a "public use" (U.S. 
Const. Amend. V; Utah Const. § 22), the sco^e of a project 
defines the outer perimeters of the "public [use." The scope 
of the original airport project necessitated the public's use 
of 37 acres and — "budgetary restraints" or not — no more 
could have been taken by the County at that point. 
Acquisition of the subject property in the second 
condemnation was thus not within the scope pf the original 
project, nor was it within Ferrebee's reasonable expectations. 
1986 condemnation 
1975 condemnation" 
The trial court's finding of fact that "the 
was a complete and separate action from the 
is not clearly erroneous and the court's decision to allow 
Ferrebee to recover the enhanced value of the subject property 
must stand. 
phis point rests on 
from the very 
is acquired are not 
The County's contrary argument on 
the contention that enhanced values arising 
condemnation proceedings by which property 
recoverable. The County correctly cites United States v. 
Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1949), and Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Grutter, 734 P.2d 434 (Ut^ ah 1986), in 
support of this proposition. The principle, however, is 
I 
irrelevant to this case because Ferrebee has not been awarded 
an enhancement flowing from the 1986 condemnation. Rather, 
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the enhancement of the subject property's value was realized 
in 1975 when 37 acres of Ferrebee's property were taken for 
the original airport. And, consistent with Miller, Reynolds 
and Utah statutory provisions on eminent domain, Ferrebee is 
entitled to the actual value of his property as measured on 
the date of the service of summons (May 16, 1986). Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-11 (1987) ; Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-
Irons Recreation Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Thus, the trial court correctly included in this 
value any enhancement derived from the government's use of 
Ferrebee's property acquired in 1975. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Adopting The Appraisal Of J. Philip Cook As The Best 
Estimate Of The Property's Fair Market Value 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Ferrebee is 
entitled to the value of the subject property as enhanced by 
its proximity to the airport. The appraisals of Phillip A. 
Snell and J. Philip Cook considered this enhancement in their 
valuations. The trial court adopted Mr. Cook's appraisal as 
the best estimate of the subject property's fair market value. 
R. 410. In challenging the trial court's adoption of the Cook 
appraisal and arguing its admissibility, the County must 
establish that the trial court acted so clearly outside reason 
as to be arbitrary and capricious. Peatross v. Board of 
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Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976)| • This the County 
cannot do. 
A. The Cook Appraisal Properly Determined That The 
Highest and Best Use Of The Property Was For 
Interim Agricultural Use With Future Use In 
Conjunction With The Airport 
"The owner of property under condemnation is entitled 
to a value based upon the highest and best ijise to which [the 
property] could be put at the time of the taking, without 
limitation as to the use then actually madei of it." State 
v. Jacobs, 307 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah 1964)(emphasis supplied). 
Highest and best use thus includes a use "reasonably likely to 
take place in the near future, whereby availability of this 
future use would have affected the market price." United 
States v. 46,672.96 Acres of Land, 521 F.2<d 13, 15 (10th Cir. 
1975)(emphasis supplied)(citing, Wilson v. United States, 350 
F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1965)). Additionally, the highest and 
best use of a parcel may be found to be a ijse in conjunction 
with other parcels, and any increment of Vc 
'i lue resulting from 
from a combination of parcels may be taken into consideration 
in valuing the parcel condemned. United States v. Fuller, 409 
I 
U.S. 488, 490 (1973). Finally, the admission of evidence 
regarding highest and best use lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Jacobs, 39t P.2d at 464. 
The County challenges the court's acceptance of Mr. 
Cook's determination that the highest and test use of the 
-25-
property is for interim agricultural use with future use in 
conjunction with the airport. App. Br. 18. The County 
asserts that "highest and best use" may be determined only by 
reference to the physical, legal, and economic uses of 
property. Id. This three-part test, however, is the product 
of academic dialogue only and has not been discussed in 
relevant case law. The controlling test for highest and best 
use contained in the cases focuses on the reasonable 
probability of a use. State v. Jacobs, supra; United States 
v. 46,672.96 Acres of Land, supra. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated below, the trial court's acceptance of the Cook 
appraisal's conclusion regarding highest and best use of the 
subject property is supported by abundant evidence and meets 
not only the applicable legal test derived from case law, but 
also the three-part test propounded by the County. 
As an initial matter, it is quite clear that the 
subject property was physically suitable for the highest and 
best use found by the trial court. The trial court was 
presented with the ultimate conclusion of two appraisers that 
the highest and best use of the property was for interim 
agricultural use with future use in conjunction with the 
airport. R. 434 at 11; Exhibit 91 at 29; R. 439 at 709, 737-
42; Exhibit 23 at 13-14. Moreover, even the County's 
appraiser, Mr. Fugii, testified consistently with Mr. Cook and 
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Mr. Snell that the physical characteristics of the land would 
support commercial and industrial development. R. 438 at 516. 
Regarding legal feasibility, the County's contention 
(App. Br. 18-20) that zoning restrictions prohibited 
commercial use of the subject property ignotes the fact that 
highest and best use analysis transcends zoning limitations in 
place when the property is condemned if a zbning change is 
"reasonably probable." Jacobs, 307 P.2d at)464; People v. 
Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964, 966 (19^6). Whether or 
not a zoning change is "reasonably probable," moreover, is a 
question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule. H & R 
Corp. v. District of Columbia, 351 F.2d 740l, 742 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). Here, testimony at trial established that the 
forecasted growth of the airport/s role in handling Wasatch 
Front air traffic created a "good possibility" of a zoning 
variance or zoning change. R. 439 at 738. Mr. Cook, 
moreover, specifically analyzed the probability of a zoning 
change in arriving at his estimation of value,8 and an 
appraiser is reasonably expected to possess special knowledge 
of the factors which bear upon the probability of a zoning 
change. 0.040 Acres of Land v. State, 57 lj>el. 173, 198 A. 2d 7 
(1964). The trial court's acceptance of tfye Cook appraisal, 
Mr. Cook specifically analyzed several zoning factors. These include 
neighborhood conformity, access, likelihood of residential development 
and any zoning ordinances applicable to the airport. Exhibit 91 at 26-
27. 
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therefore, cannot be faulted on "legal feasibility" grounds. 
Dunn, 297 P.2d at 966. 
Regarding the element of economic feasibility, the 
fact that the airport was expected to become an integral part 
of the air systems needed along the Wasatch Front supports the 
conclusion, offered by Mr. Snell, that there was a "strong 
likelihood" of a demand for the property in conjunction with 
the airport. R. 439 at 741-42. Mr. Cook, in turn, thoroughly 
evaluated demand for the property by reviewing aviation air 
traffic studies, by considering the likelihood of the airport 
attracting third-party operators to lease property for fixed-
based operations, and by considering the likelihood of 
through-the-fence access to the airport. Based upon these 
evaluations, Mr. Cook concluded that "demand is likely for 
land surrounding the airport." Exhibit 91 at 27-29. In fact, 
Ferrebee began experiencing demand for the subject property 
immediately after completion of the 1975 condemnation 
proceedings when he was approached by Commissioner Buzianis. 
Mr. Buzianis told Ferrebee that the subject property was very 
valuable and expressed his desire in participating with 
Ferrebee in developing the subject property. R. 439 at 812-
14. 
In light of the testimony and evidence summarized 
above, the trial court's finding regarding the property's 
highest and best is well grounded. The trial court's 
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conclusion, far from being arbitrary and capricious, was based 
upon appraisal evidence that carefully and expertly canvassed 
all elements necessary to a sound estimation of value. The 
trial court's adoption of the Cook appraisa][, therefore, 
should be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Admitting The Cook Appraisal 
The County argues that the trial c^urt erred in 
relying on Mr. Cook's appraisal because the airport proximity 
enhancement factor was based upon hearsay evidence and because 
some of the comparable properties used in his appraisal were 
acquired under threat of condemnation. Theke arguments fail 
because there is no requirement that expertj opinion be based 
upon independently admissible evidence. Moreover, the 
admissibility of expert testimony is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, which was nojt abused in this 
case. 
1. An Expert Appraisers Opinion Hay Be 
Partially Derived From Hearsay 
A trial court is allowed wide discretion in passing 
on matters relating to expert testimony in condemnation cases. 
United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1401 
(10th Cir. 1974)(citing Montana Ry Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348 
(1890)). And, matters regarding the admission of expert 
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testimony cannot be overruled unless there is a "clear showing 
of abuse." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 
1974). The Utah Supreme Court has specifically applied this 
rule in the context of condemnation proceedings. Utah Dep't 
of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984). 
Once a witness is qualified as an expert by the trial 
court he may base his opinion on reports, writings or 
observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by 
others, so long as they are the type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in that particular field. Utah R. Evid. 703; State 
v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982). Specifically in 
condemnation proceedings, an appraiser's valuation is 
admissible even though it is based in part upon hearsay 
derived from statements or reports of others. In Re Lee, 317 
S.E.2d 75, 81-82 (N.C. App. 1984); United States v. 1,1014.16 
Acres, 558 F. Supp. 1238 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 
1371 (8th Cir. 1984); City of Portland v. Nudelman, 45 Or. 
App. 425, 608 P.2d 1190, 1195 (1980). 
This rule is especially applicable in the context of 
appraisers employing the comparable sales approach because the 
appraiser is often required to obtain information from 
reliable sources regarding comparable property. As a result, 
the appraiser is allowed wide latitude in gathering 
information and may base his opinion on evidence not otherwise 
admissible. In Re Lee, 317 S.E.2d at 81. In the context of a 
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comparable sales appraisal, hearsay is routinely sought by the 
appraiser as a standard method of appraising real estate. Id. 
at 82. In the instant case, Mr. Cook testified that 
appraisals based on comparable sales are often based on 
information from reliable sources and that the sources relied 
upon by him were highly reliable. R. 434 at 40. 
Additionally, his report indicates that the comparable sales 
used to determine a value enhancement for airport proximity 
42. 
tlty to cross-




were independently verified. Exhibit 91 at 
The County complains of its inabilf 
examine the experts furnishing information 
However, the fact that an expert opinion isj 
statements or information compiled by others goes to the 
weight to be given the expert opinion rathqr than its 
admissibility. Clayton, 646 P.2d at 726; 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, v. 
Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1974). The Comity had the 
opportunity to attempt to discredit Mr. Cook and to expose any 
legitimate deficiencies in his opinion by challenging the 
suitability and reliability of information upon which he 
relied in forming his opinion during cross+examination. 
Having failed in this opportunity, the County now contends 
that the opportunity was insufficient. The argument, however, 
is contrary to sound reasoning and the lawj 
be rejected. 
and must therefore 
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2 . The Trial Court Did Mot Commit Clear Error By 
Admitting An Appraisal Based In Part On Sales 
Made Under Threat of Condemnation 
Mr. Cook's appraisa l used s ix comparables involving 
ru ra l property located adjacent t o small a i r p o r t s . Exhibit 91 
a t 42-43. The unava i l ab i l i t y of comparables involving 
property adjacent to a i r p o r t s required him to use two 
comparables which were sold a t a j u d i c i a l l y es tabl i shed pr ice 
in condemnation proceedings. Exhibit 91 a t 43. Mr. Cook's 
appra isa l s t a t e s t h a t these comparables were caut iously 
considered because they were condemnation s a l e s , but a lso 
indicated t h a t "the premium in these cases i s very s imi lar t o 
the premiums paid in negotiated t r a n s a c t i o n s . " Exhibit 91 a t 
43. The County argues t h a t such comparables are inadmissible 
and t h a t Mr. Cook's appraisa l must be re jec ted on t h i s b a s i s . 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s acceptance of Mr. Cook's appra i sa l , however, 
ea s i ly withstands t h i s challenge for several reasons.9 
F i r s t , as noted j u s t above, an e x p e r t ' s opinion i s 
admissible even though i t i s p a r t i a l l y based on inadmissible 
evidence — such as condemnation s a l e s . Utah R. Evid. 703. 
A t r i a l court i s allowed wide d i scre t ion in passing on matters re la t ing 
to expert testimony in condemnation cases . United States v. 25.02 
Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1401 (10th Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) ( c i t a t i o n omitted). 
Thus, the t r i a l court ' s dec i s ion to admit the testimony of Mr. Cook can 
be reversed only upon a "clear showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bangarty , 
525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974). This standard has s p e c i f i c a l l y been 
applied in the context of a t r i a l judge's dec i s ion to admit or exclude 
comparable s a l e s . State v. Kunimoto, 62 Haw. 502, 617 P.2d 93, 97 
(Haw. 1980). 
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All of the cases cited by the County to support its position 
pre-date the 1975 adoption of Rule 703 of ti}e Federal Rules of 
Evidence which abandoned the requirement thkt an expert form 
his opinion based on personal knowledge or ^acts made known to 
him in court. Utah Rule of Evidence 703 wast adopted in 1971 
and follows the federal rule verbatim. Like the federal rule, 
Utah's adoption of Rule 703 rendered obsolete the requirement 
of the predecessor to Utah's Rule 703, RuleJ56(2), that an 
expert's opinion be based upon personal knowledge or courtroom 
information. Utah R. Evid. 703 (advisory committee note). 
All of the cases cited by the County to support its position 
predate this reversal of the law and are therefore negated by 
the change effectuated by the adoption of Rule 703. 
Second, the comparables complained! of by the County 
have not been admitted as direct substantive evidence of the 
condemned property's value. Rather, the cojmparables were 
merely used as a basis in forming an expertj opinion. And, it 
jevidence — not the 
based. In this 
is the expert opinion which is admitted as 
comparable sales upon which the opinion is 
situation, the requirement of showing similarity between the 
subject property and other comparables is hot as rigorous as 
when comparable sales are offered as substantive proof of 
value. f=3CUnited States v. 0.161 Acres of Land, 837 F.2d 
1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus, the fact that comparables 
acquired under the threat of condemnation \|ere used in Mr. 
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Cook's opinion speaks only to the credibility of his expert 
opinion, not its admissibility. Kunimoto, 617 P.2d 93, at 98. 
As a result, it is not an abuse of discretion to accept an 
expert appraisal using comparables of other sales under threat 
of condemnation. Honolulu Redevelopment Agency v. Pun Gun, 49 
Haw. 640, 426 P.2d 324, 328 (1967). 
Finally, the County's argument is especially anemic 
in light of the dearth of comparables available. In 
situations where there are few instances of comparable sales, 
the appraiser's opinion need not be derived from objective 
market data. United States v. 25.7 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 
1396, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1986). None of the cases cited by the 
County to support its position involve a situation where there 
was an inadequate number of comparable sales. Moreover, when 
there is a necessity for evidence because the only sales of 
comparable property have been under threat of condemnation, 
such comparables may be independently admissible even as 
direct substantive evidence. Honolulu Redevelopment Agency, 
426 P.2d at 325-26; City and County of Honolulu v. 
International Air Serv. Co., 63 Haw. 322, 628 P.2d 192, 198 
(Haw. 1981). In this case, the comparables were not admitted 
as direct substantive evidence, but were merely used in 
forming an expert opinion offered as evidence. Therefore, in 
this context, there can be no question but that the trial 
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court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mr. Cook's 
appraisal. 
III. The Trial Court Erred In Using An inadmissible Option 
Agreement To Determine The Cost Of Accessing The 
Condemned Property 
The 1975 condemnation action left JFerrebee with 43.66 
landlocked acres. At the conclusion of the 1986 condemnation 
action, the trial court's final order deducted $19,240 from 
the agricultural base value of the land as the cost of 
obtaining access. R. 410. Rather than basing the amount of 
this adjustment on the $500 per acre appraised value of the 
adjoining property, which the court found do be the most 
likely measure of value to be adopted between Ferrebee and his 
tenant Floyd Walters, who owned the adjacent access property, 
based upon their informal agreement, R. 431 at 5, the court 
based the amount of the adjustment on an unexercised 1986 
written option agreement granting Ferrebee the right to 
acquire the same access property at ten times its fair market 
value. R. 439 at 652; R. 411; R. 439 at 665. This option 
agreement was executed at the insistence of Ferrebee's 
attorney in spite of the fact that Ferrebee had a gentleman's 
agreement with Mr. Walters which allowed Ferrebee free access 
over the Walters' leased property and an informal agreement to 
acquire any needed access at fair market value. R. 439 at 
658-66, 812. This informal agreement was peither superseded 
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nor affected by the 1986 option agreement and continued in 
effect up to and including the date of condemnation. R. 439 
at 665-66. 
As a matter of law, an option is inadmissible as 
evidence of market value because the nature of an option is 
"entirely too uncertain, shadowy and speculative to form a 
solid foundation for determining value." United States v. 
Smith, 355 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1966). Indeed, an option 
agreement is typically induced by speculation and a 
willingness to take a chance that uncertain events will occur 
and make the option profitable. Id. Courts have therefore 
reasoned that option "contracts [are] based upon so many 
contingencies as to be meaningless on the issue of fair market 
value." Costello Profit Sharing Trust v. State Roads Comm'n, 
315 Md. 693, 556 A.2d 1102, 1105 (citations omitted) cert, 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 157 (1989). Option agreements are thus 
inadmissible for purposes of determining value. Smith, 355 
F.2d at 811; Costello Profit Sharing Trust v. State Roads 
Comm'n, 315 Md. 693, 556 A.2d 1102, 1104, cert, denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 157 (1989); City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 Kan. 621, 433 
P.2d 351, 353 (1967); State v. Williams,, 357 S.W.2d 799, 802 
(Tex. 1962); New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bowley, 27 N.J. 
549, 143 A.2d 558, 562 (1958), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 927 
(1959) . 
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The soundness of the rule prohibiting the 
admissibility of option agreements is illustrated by the 
record in this case. Mr. Cook's appraisal set the fair market 
value of access to the subject property at $500 per acre, 
Exhibit 91 at 42, and recognized that the 1^ 86 option at 
$5,000 per acre was "substantially above market value on a per 
acre basis." Id. at 41-42. Indeed, Mr. Walters had assured 
Ferrebee of free access to the landlocked property since 1979 
through the date of condemnation. R. 439 at 658-60, 812. The 
option, therefore, is pure speculation and pffers no 
indication of the subject property's value. By adopting the 
option price as evidence to the subject property's value, the 
court failed to distinguish expert evidence indicating value 
from irrelevant speculation. 
Mr. Cook's appraisal indicated that a fair market 
purchase of access for the subject property would not 
significantly reduce the value of the property (no more than 
3.7% or $1,924). Exhibit 91 at 42. Given the trial court's 
inappropriate reliance on the 1986 option ih determining 
value, this Court should deduct the cost of access based upon 
the $500 per acre fair market value of the land needed for 
access and adjust the value of the subject property 
accordingly. This would provide an ultimate valuation of 
$52,000 (base agricultural value) less $1,924 (cost of access) 
times 125% (the airport proximity enhancement factor), which 
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equals $112,671. This result is legally sound and supports 
practical concerns relating to the unreliability of an option 
agreement as an indication of value. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred In Refusing To Award Ferrebee 
Attorney's Fees And In Refusing To Award Ferrebee The 
Cost Of Obtaining A Reliable Appraisal Based On The 
County's Bad Faith Conduct 
The trial court found that the the County did not 
comply with the procedural requirements of the state and 
federal relocation acts in that the county (1) failed to act 
expeditiously to acquire Ferrebee7s property by negotiation, 
(2) failed to notify Ferrebee that it was having the subject 
property appraised, (3) failed to give Ferrebee an opportunity 
to accompany the County's appraiser's during their inspection 
of the property, (4) failed to offer Ferrebee the lowest 
appraisal amount for purchase of the property and (5) failed 
to make full disclosure to Ferrebee of information which was 
the basis for the amount used by the County in negotiations 
with Ferrebee. R. 411-12. Additionally, the County delayed 
almost five years from the date of its first appraisal before 
making an offer to Ferrebee. Moreover, when the County did 
make an offer of purchase, it ranged between seven and 
eighteen times lower than the fair market value established by 
the County's own prior appraisals. Finally, the County's bad 
faith was clearly underscored when it presented Ferrebee with 
an ultimatum that the County's abusive offer be accepted 
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within two weeks or costly litigation would be commenced. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the trial court denied 
an award of attorney's fees or appraisal costs. This was 
erroneous. 
To refuse an award of attorney's f^ es and appraisal 
costs in these circumstances is to declare that, unless 
private property owners possess sufficient personal resources 
to pay substantial legal fees and appraisal 
the difference between actual value and the 
offered value is significant enough to justify the enormous 
cost of litigation, private citizens are powerless to compel 
costs, and unless 
government's 
fair treatment at the hands of a condemning authority. The 
Court should not condone this result. The County's bad faith 
conduct entitles Ferrebee to his attorney's 
costs. 
fees and appraisal 
A. The County7s Bad Faith In Attempting To Condemn 
Ferrebee's Property For Only $275 Per Acre 
Justifies An Award of Attorney's Fees Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
Attorney's fees are recoverable when a statutory 
basis for the award exists. Canyon Country Store v. Braceyf 
781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989)(citation omitted). In this 
case, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987, as amended) provides 
the statutory basis requiring an award of Attorney's fees. 
That statute provides in relevant part: 
In civil actions, the court shall 1 award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
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party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith• . . • 
Id.(emphasis supplied). The statute contains the dual 
requirements that the action be (1) without merit and (2) not 
brought in good faith. An action lacks merit if it has "no 
basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1983). As to the second requirement, the County must be 
deemed to have lacked good faith if any of the following 
obtain: (1) the County lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of its activities; (2) the County intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of Ferrebee; or (3) the County 
intended its suit to hinder, delay or defraud Ferrebee. See, 
Id. Importantly, the statute's use of mandatory language 
evidences the severely restricted discretion of the trial 
court to award attorney's fees when the statutory conditions 
are met. 
1. The Trial Court Erroneously Refused To 
Award Attorney's Fees Based On Its 
Conclusion That The Relocation Act Was 
Inapplicable 
The trial court's decision to refuse an award of 
attorney's fees was erroneously based upon its conclusion that 
the state and federal relocation acts are inapplicable to this 
case. Although the trial court noted that application of the 
relocation acts would likely require that attorney's fees be 
awarded, R. 431 at 6, it failed to recognize that § 78-27-56 
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is a self-standina statute imposing the requirement of an 
award of fees whenever litigation is conducted in bad faith. 
And, the County's failure to comply with the relocation acts 
— despite its agreement with the FAA to do so — is abundant 
evidence of bad faith. Therefore, § 78-27-56 requires an 
award of fees in this case without regard tcj) the applicability 
of the relocation acts. 
The principal purpose of the Utah Relocation Act "is 
to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable 
treatment of persons displaced" by condemnation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-12-2 (1987, as amended)C. While Ferrebee was not 
"displaced" by the County's actions here, the Act also evinces 
an intent to assure that eminent domain powers are exercised 
with due consideration for the rights of all condemnees. 
Section 57-12-13 evidences this purpose by providing: 
as to which 
the eminent 
Any Agency acquiring real property] 
it has the power to acquire under 
domain or condemnation laws of thijs state 
shall comply with the following policies: 
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made 
to acquire expeditiously real| 
negotiation. 
property by 
(2) Real property shall be abpraised 
before the initiation of negotiation, and 
the owner or his designated 
representative shall be given an 
opportunity to accompany the appraiser 
during his inspection of the property. 
(3) Before the initiation of 
for real property, an amount 
established which is reasonably believed 




such amount shall be offered for the 
property. In no event shall such amount 
be less than the lowest approved 
appraisal of the fair market value of the 
property. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-12-13 (l)-(3) (1987, as amended). 
The trial court made specific findings of fact that 
none of these requirements were met by the County. Ferrebee 
submits that the purpose and intent of the Act encompasses 
this case and that the County's non-compliance with the Act's 
procedural requirements further justifies an award of 
attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. 
Additionally, the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1201 et seq. (1987) evidences the 
propriety of an award of fees in the instant case. Section 
17A-2-1238(2) of the Act provides for an award of attorney's 
fees to a condemnee when the condemnee contests the condemning 
authority's valuation of the property in court and receives an 
award in excess of the condemning authority's pre-litigation 
offer. Though not directly applicable to the instant case, 
this statute exemplifies the necessity of protecting 
condemnees from the heavy-handed tactics of a condemning 
authority. Further, the statute illustrates the State of 
Utah's policy of allowing attorney's fees to condemnees 
subjected to governmental abuses — a well-established policy 
ignored by the trial court. 
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2. Section 78-27-56, Standing Alone, 
Requires An Award of Attorney s Fees 
are clearly met in 
Based On The County's Bad Faith 
Analyzing § 78-27-56 alone, the conditions which 
trigger the requirement of an award of fees 
this case. The County's strategy of browbeating Ferrebee into 
accepting $275 per acre for the property, under the costly 
threat of litigation, and its subsequent decision to pursue 
that tactic through litigation, is not justified in fact and 
is without merit given the County's certain knowledge that the 
appraised value of the property was many times greater than 
the offered amount. At the time the County made its $275 per 
acre offer to Ferrebee, it had received appraisals of the 
subject property valuing the property at $l|,750 per acre and 
$4,500 per acre. The fact that the County Jiad budgeted 
$1,750 per acre to acquire the land in its 
funding is clear evidence of the County's legitimate belief as 
to the subject property's value. Under thejse circumstances, 
the $275 per acre appraisal upon which the 
purchase was based was deceptive on its face. Additionally, 
the $275 per acre appraisal had been been mortally discredited 
and conclusively established as incompetent by the County's 
own review appraisal. It cannot be forgotten in this context 
that the County is a public body with a duty to deal 
faithfully and fairly with the public. The County's position 
was, therefore, clearly without merit. 
application for FAA 
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The County's bad faith in this action is likewise 
readily apparent. First, the County clearly lacked an honest 
belief in the propriety of its effort to obtain the subject 
property for $275 per acre when it had informed the FAA that 
$1,750 per acre would be required for the subject property and 
had applied for federal funding based on that amount. Given 
the $1,750 per acre and $4,500 per acre appraisals of the 
property received by the County and the fact that the $275 per 
acre appraisal had been wholly discredited, it is beyond 
imagination to rationally suggest that the County had an 
"honest belief" that the property was worth only $275 per 
acre. The County's efforts to obtain the property based on 
this figure clearly represent an intention to take 
unconscionable advantage of Ferrebee and to defraud him of his 
right to receive just compensation. Finally, the county's 
unconscionable demand that Ferrebee accept the $275 offer 
within only two weeks or face litigation is highly indicative 
of the county's bad faith in its dealings with Ferrebee. 
Therefore, the County's conduct clearly meets the bad faith 
requirement. 
In short, the County's conduct precipitating this 
action has been reprehensible and flagrantly abusive. The 
action was without merit and brought in bad faith. Such 
conduct, if condoned, would give condemning authorities the 
unfettered power to steal land from private citizens at values 
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clearly below market rates by simply raising the iron fisted 
threat of litigation, which in the ultimate irony would be 
waged with the citizens7 own tax dollars. Tpe only 
alternative for the private citizen, especially in cases of 
smaller economic scale, will be to cut losses and accept the 
condemnor's offer. Our system of law and g 
of a need to restrict just such a disregard |of individual 
rights. Section 78-27-56 has no purpose at all if it cannot 
be relied upon to remedy the County's conduct in this case. 
The trial court's decision to refuse an awayd of attorney's 
fees must be reversed. 
'1 vernment was born 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Refusing To Award Ferrebee The Cost Of Obtaining 
Credible Appraisals. 
Ferrebee acknowledges that the Utah Court of Appeals 
has ruled that expert witness fees are not awardable as part 
of a condemnee's just compensation in condemnation 
proceedings. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1123 (Utah Ct. App 
granted, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). However, this Court has 
granted certiorari to review that decision. Moreover, the 
instant case presents egregious circumstances. Consideration 
of the County's conduct mandates that Ferrebee be reimbursed 
for his reasonable costs incurred in obtaining a credible 
appraisal. Ferrebee's only choice was to rfebut the County's 
. 1989), cert. 
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bad faith offer with an expert's opinion to establish the 
actual market value of the property. It is simply inequitable 
to require Ferrebee to absorb the significant costs of 
appraisal caused by the County's attempt to pay an 
unconscionably low price for his property. 
CONCLUSION 
The County's claims of error are meritless and the 
trial court's rulings on those points should be affirmed. The 
judgment, however, should be modified to base the cost of 
obtaining access on the fair market value of that access, 
which in this case was $1,924.00. Furthermore, Ferrebee 
should be awarded his attorney's fees and appraisal costs. 
DATED Wednesday this f(p day of October, 1991 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Bv 
Evail Al SchmutzNteseo ^ ^ 
HOLME/ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main Street, 
Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Ferrebee 
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57-11-19 REAL ESTATE 
57-11-19. Extradition proceedings against person charged 
with crime. 
In the proceedings for extradition of a person charged with a crime under 
this act, it need not be shown that the person whose surrender is demanded 
has fled from justice or at the time of the commission of the crime was in the 
demanding or other state. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, § 19. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchline following § 57-11-1. 
57-11-20. Service of process. 
(1) In addition to the methods of service provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, service may be made by delivering a copy of the process to the 
office of the division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, which may be 
the division in a proceeding instituted by it: 
(a) forthwith sends a copy of the process and of the pleading by certified 
or registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last known ad-
dress, and 
(b) the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this section is filed in the 
case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such 
further time as the court allows. 
(2) If any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in con-
duct prohibited by this act or any rule or order hereunder, and has not filed a 
consent to service of process and personal jurisdiction over him cannot other-
wise be obtained in this state, that conduct authorizes the division to receive 
service of process in any noncriminal proceeding against him or his successor 
which grows out of the conduct and which is brought under this act or any 
rule or order hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on him 
personally. Notice shall be given as provided in Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, § 20. Cross-References. — Service of process, 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under Rules 4 and 5, U.R.C.P. 
same catchline following § 57-11-1. 
57-11-21. Uniformity of construction. 
This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, 8 21. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
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Definitions. 
Federal funds — Direct assis-
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Rules of displacing agency. 
Displacing agency may contract 
for services or function through 
another agency. 
Payments not income or resources 
for welfare or tax purposes. 
Judicial review. 
Procedure for acquisition of prop-
erty. 
57-12-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Relocation Assis-
tance Act." 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act." - The term U)his 
act" means L. 1972, ch. 24, §§ 1 through 13, 
which appear as §§ 57-12-1 through 57-12-13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Eminent Domain 
Compensation in Western States: A Critique of 
the Fair Market Value Model, 1984 Utah L. 
Rev. 429. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent 
Domain § 279. 
C.J.S. — 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 446. 
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and appli-
cation of state relocation assistance laws, 49 
A.L.R.4th 491. 
Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain «=> 301 
et seq. 
57-12-2. Declaration of policy. 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this act and of the state of Utah, and 
the Legislature recognizes: 
(1) That it is often necessary for the various agencies of state and local 
government to acquire land by condemnation; 
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often uprooted and dis-
placed by such action while being recompensed only for the value of land 
taken; 
(3) That such displacement often works economic hardship on those 
least able to suffer the added and uncompensated costs of moving, locat-
ing new homes, business sites, farms, and other costs of being relocated; 
(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be included as a part 
of the project cost and paid to those displaced; 
(5) That the Congress of the United States has established matching 
grants for relocation assistance, and has also established uniform policies 
for land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land 
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, to assist the states in meeting these 
expenses and assuring that land is fairly acquired; 
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state of Utah to provide for 
such payments and to establish such land acquisition policies. 
421 
57-12-3 REAL ESTATE 
Therefore, the purpose of this act is to establish a uniform policy for the fair 
and equitable treatment of persons displaced by the acquisition of real prop-
erty by state and local land acquisition programs, by building code enforce-
ment activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of buildings or 
other improvements conducted pursuant to governmental supervision. 
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to put into effect 
the foregoing policies and purposes. 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, $ 2. Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Poli-
Meaning of "this act." — See note under cies Act of 1970, cited in Subsection (5), is codi-
same catehline following § 57-12-1 fied as 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq. 
Federal Law. — The Uniform Relocation 
57-12-3. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Agency" means a department, division, agency, commission, 
board, council, committee, authority, or other instrumentality of the state 
or of a political subdivision of the state whether one or more. 
(2) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, or associ-
ation. 
(3) "Displaced person" means any person who, after the effective date 
of this act, moves from real property, or who moves his personal property 
from real property, or moves or discontinues his business or moves his 
dwelling as a result of the acquisition of the real property, in whole or in 
part, or as a result of a written order of the acquiring agency to vacate 
real property for a program of purchase undertaken by an agency or as a 
direct result of code enforcement activities or a program of rehabilitation 
of buildings conducted pursuant to a federal or state assisted program. 
(4) "Non-profit organization" means all corporations, societies, and as-
sociations whose object is not pecuniary profit, but is to promote the 
general interest and welfare of the members, whether temporal, social, or 
spiritual. 
(5) "Business" means any lawful activity, excepting a farm operation, 
conducted primarily: 
(a) for the purpose, sale, lease, or rental of personal or real prop-
erty, and for the manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, 
commodities, or any other personal property; 
(b) for the sale of services to the public; 
(c) by a nonprofit org^inizatiori^or 
(d) for assisting in the purchase, sale, resale, manufacture, pro-
cessing, or marketing of products, commodities, personal property, or 
services by the erection and maintenance of an outdoor advertising 
display or displays, whether or not such display or displays are lo-
cated on the premises on which any of the above activities are con-
ducted. 
(6) "Farm operation" means any activity conducted solely or primarily 
for the production of one or more agricultural products or commodities, 
including timber, for sale or home use, and customarily producing such 
products or commodities in sufficient quantity to be capable of contribut-
ing materially to the operator's support. 
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History: L. 1972, ch. 24, $ 3. date of this act" in Subsection (3) means the 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under effective date of L. 1972, ch. 24, i.e., March 30, 
same catchline following § 57-12-1. 1972. 
Compiler's Notes. —- The term "effective 
57-12-4. Federal funds — Direct assistance. 
(1) When federal funds are available for payment of direct financial assis-
tance to persons displaced by acquisition of real property by any agency, the 
displacing agency is authorized to use such federal funds with state or local 
funds to the extent provided by federal law and may provide such direct 
financial assistance in the instances and on the conditions set forth by federal 
law and regulations. 
(2) When federal funds are not available or used for payment of direct 
financial assistance to persons displaced by the acquisition of real property by 
an agency, the displacing agency may provide direct financial assistance to 
such persons. Financial assistance authorized by this Subsection (2) shall not 
exceed the total amount that would have been payable under Subsection (1) of 
this section if federal funds had been available or used. 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 4. 
57-12-5. Reimbursement of owner for expenses. 
Any agency acquiring real property for its use shall as soon as practicable 
after the date of payment of the purchase price or the date of deposit into court 
of funds to satisfy the award of compensation in a condemnation proceeding to 
acquire real property, whichever is the earlier, reimburse the owner, to the 
extent the agency deems fair and reasonable, for expenses the owner necessar-
ily incurred for: 
(1) recording fees, transfer taxes, and similar expenses incidental to 
conveying the real property to the agency; 
(2) penalty costs for prepayment for any pre-existing recorded mort-
gage entered into in good faith encumbering the real property; and 
(3) the pro rata portion of real property taxes paid which are allocable 
to a period subsequent to the date of vesting title in the agency, or the 
effective date of possession of such real property by the agency, whichever 
is the earlier. 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 5. 
57-12-6. Buildings, structures or other improvements. 
(1) Where any interest in real property is acquired, an equal interest in all 
buildings, structures, or other improvements located upon the real property so 
acquired and which is required to be removed from the real property or which 
is determined to be adversely affected by the use to which the real property 
will be put, shall be acquired. 
(2) For the purpose of determining the just compensation to be paid for any 
building, structure, or other improvement required to be acquired under Sub-
section (1), the building, structure, or other improvement shall be deemed to 
be a part of the real property to be acquired, notwithstanding the right or 
obligation of a tenant, as against the owner of any other interest in the real 
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property, to remove the building, structure, or improvement at the expiration 
of his term, and the fair market value which the building, structure, or im-
provement contributes to the fair market value of the property to be acquired, 
or the fair market value of the building, structure, or improvement for re-
moval from the real property, whichever is the greater, shall be paid to the 
tenant therefor 
(3) Payment for the buildings, structures, or improvements as set forth m 
Subsection (2) shall not result m duplication of any payments otherwise au-
thorized by state law No payment shall be made unless the owner of the land 
involved disclaims all interest in the improvements of the tenant In consider-
ation for any payment, the tenant shall assign, transfer, and release all his 
right, title and interest in and to the improvements Nothing with regard to 
this acquisition of buildings, structures, or other improvements shall be con-
strued to deprive the tenants of any rights to reject payment and to obtain 
payment for these property interests in accordance with other laws of this 
state 
History L 1972, ch 24, & 6 
57-12-7. Replacement dwelling. 
(1) No person shall be required to move or be relocated from land used as 
his residence and acquired under any of the condemnation or eminent domain 
laws of this state until he has been offered a comparable replacement dwelling 
which is a decent, safe, clean, and sanitary dwelling adequate to accommodate 
this person, reasonably accessible to public services and places of employment, 
and available on the private market 
(2) If a program or project cannot proceed to actual construction because 
comparable sale or rental housing is not available, and the head of the agency 
determines that this housing cannot otherwise be made available, he may 
take such action as is necessary or appropriate to provide this housing by use 
of funds authorized for the project 
(3) No person shall be required to move from his dwelling after the effective 
date of this act, on account of any project of the agency, unless the agency 
head is satisfied that replacement housing is available to this person 
History L. 1972, ch 24, § 7 fective date of this act see note under same 
Compiler's Notes — For translation of ef catch)me following § 57 12 3 
57-12-8. Advisory program. 
(1) Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project un-
dertaken by an agency will result in the displacement of any person after the 
effective date of this act, the agency shall provide a relocation assistance 
advisory program for displaced persons which shall offer the services pre-
scribed in this act If the agency determines that any person occupying prop-
erty immediately adjacent to the real property acquired is caused substantial 
economic injury because of the acquisition, it may offer this person relocation 
advisory services under such program 
(2) Each relocation assistance program required by Subsection (1) shall 
include such measures, facilities, or services as may be necessary or appropn 
ate in order 
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(a) to determine the needs of displaced persons, business concerns, and 
nonprofit organizations for relocation assistance, 
(b) to assist owners of displaced businesses and farm operations in ob-
taining and becoming established in suitable business locations or re-
placement farms, 
(c) to supply information concerning programs of the federal, state, and 
local governments offering assistance to displaced persons and business 
concerns, 
(d) to assist in minimizing hardships to displaced persons in adjusting 
to relocation, and 
(e) to secure, to the greatest extent practicable, the co ordination of 
relocation activities with other project activities and other planned or 
proposed governmental actions in the community or nearby areas which 
may affect the carrying out of the relocation program 
History L 1972, ch 24, § 8 Compiler's Notes - For translation of ef 
Meaning of "this a c t " — See note under fective date of this act see note under same 
same catchhne following <* 57 12 1 catchhne following <) 57 12 3 
57-12-9. Rules of displacing agency. 
(1) The displacing agency shall enact rules to assure that 
(a) the payments and assistance authorized by this chapter are admin-
istered in a manner that is fair, reasonable, and as uniform as practica-
ble, 
(b) a displaced person who makes proper application for a payment 
authorized for him by this chapter is paid promptly after a move or, in 
hardship cases, is paid in advance, and 
(c) any person aggrieved by a determination as to eligibility for a 
payment authorized by this chapter, or the amount of a payment, may 
have his application reviewed by the head of the displacing agency 
(2) The displacing agency shall comply with the procedures and require 
ment8 of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings 
History L 1972, ch 24, § 9, 1987, ch 161, and adopt such rules and regulations as may 
§ 193 be necessary to assure deleted former SubBec 
Amendment Notes — The 1987 amend tion (lKd) pertaining to promulgation and 
ment effective January 1 1988 in the intro adoption of other rules and regulations and 
ductory language of Subsection (1) substituted added Subsection (2) 
enact rules to assure that ' for promulgate 
57-12-10. Displacing agency may contract for services or 
function through another agency. 
To prevent unnecessary expense and duplication of functions and to pro 
mote uniform and effective administration of relocation assistance programs 
for displaced persons, the displacing agency may enter into contracts with any 
person for services in connection with these programs, or may carry out its 
functions under this act through any agency or any federal agency or instru-
mentality 
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History: L. 1972, ch. 24, ~§ 10. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchline following § 57-12-1. 
57-12-11. Payments not income or resources for welfare or 
tax purposes. 
No payment received by a displaced person under this act shall be consid-
ered as income or resources for the purpose of determining the eligibility or 
extent of eligibility of any person for assistance under any state law or for the 
purposes of the state's individual income tax, corporation franchise tax, or 
other tax laws. These payments shall not be considered as income or resources 
of any recipient of public assistance, and such payments shall not be deducted 
from the amount of aid to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled. 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 11. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchline following § 57-12-1. 
57-12-12. Judicial review. 
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order concerning relocation assistance may 
obtain judicial review. 
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the 
district court of the county in which the real property taken for public use is 
located. 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, 8 12; 1987, ch. mination concerning relocation assistance au-
161, § 194. thorized by this act may appeal such determi-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- nation to the district court of the county in 
ment, effective January 1, 1988, substituted which the real property taken for public use is 
the present provisions for "Any person or busi- located." 
ne88 aggrieved by final administrative deter-
57-12-13. Procedure for acquisition of property. 
Any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to acquire 
under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of this state shall comply 
with the following policies: 
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real 
property i^JiegotiaiioxL 
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotia-
tions, and the owner or his designated representative shall be given an 
opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the prop-
erty. 
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, an amount 
shall be established which is reasonably believed to be just compensation 
therefor, and such amount shall be offered for the property. In no event 
shall such amount be less than the lowest approved appraisal of the fair 
market value of the property. Any decrease or increase of the fair market 
value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public 
improvement for which such property is acquired or by the likelihood that 
the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that 
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due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner, 
will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property. 
The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be provided with a 
written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount estab-
lished as just compensation. Where appropriate the just compensation for 
real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall 
be separately stated. 
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property 
acquired through federal or federally assisted programs before the agreed 
purchase price is paid or there is deposited with a court having jurisdic-
tion of condemnation of such property, in accordance with applicable law, 
for the benefit of the owner an amount not less than the lowest approved 
appraisal of the fair market value of such property or the amount of the 
award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding of such property. 
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be 
so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no person lawfully 
occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling (as-
suming a replacement dwelling will be available) or to move his business 
or farm operation without at least ninety days' written notice from the 
date by which such move is required. 
(6) If an owner or tenant is permitted to occupy the real property ac-
quired on a rental basis for a short term or for a period subject to termina-
tion on short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair 
rental value of the property to a short-term occupier. 
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be advanced, on negotia-
tions or condemnation and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the 
owner be deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to compel an 
agreement on the price to be paid for the property. 
(8) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the 
power of eminent domain, formal condemnation proceedings shall be in-
stituted. The acquiring agency shall not intentionally make it necessary 
for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking 
of his real property. 
(9) If the acquisition of only part of the property would leave its owner 
with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to acquire the entire property shall 
be made. 
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 13. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
'air market value. 
In condemnation proceedings any enhance-
ment or decrease in value attributable to the 
urpose for which the property is being con-
demned shall be excluded in determining the 
fair market value of the property. Redevelop-




CHAPTER 61. UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE AND 
REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICIES FOR FEDERAL 




4602. Effect upon property acquisition 
4603. Additional appropriations for moving costs, relocation benefits and 
other expenses incurred in acquisition of lands for National Park 
System; waiver of benefits. 
4604. Certification 
(a) Acceptance of State agency certification 
(b) Promulgation of regulations; monitoring and report to Congress 
on implementation by State agency; availability of information; 
notice and comment; consultation with local governments 
(c) Effect of noncompliance with certification or with applicable law 
UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE 
4621. Declaration of findings and policy 
(a) Findings 
(b) Policy 
(c) Congressional intent 
4622. Moving and related expenses 
(a) General provision 
(b) Displacement from dwelling; election of payments; moving expen-
ses and dislocation allowance 
(c) Displacement from business or farm operation; election of pay-
ments; minimum and maximum amounts; eligibility 
(d) Certain utility relocation expenses. 
4623. Replacement housing for homeowner; mortgage insurance 
4624. Replacement housing for tenants and certain others 
4625. Relocation planning, assistance coordination, and advisory services 
(a) Planning of programs or projects undertaken by Federal agencies 
or with Federal financial assistance 
(b) Availability of advisory services 
n(cj Measures, facilities, or services; description 
(d) Coordination of relocation activities with other Federal, State, or 
local governmental actions 
(e) Selection of implementation procedures 
(0 Tenants occupying property acquired for programs or projects; 
eligibility for advisory services 
4626. Housing replacement by Federal agency as last resort 
4627. State required to furnish real property incident to Federal assistance 
(local cooperation) 
4628. State acting as agent for Federal program 
4629. Public works programs and projects of District of Columbia govern-
ment and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
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4630. Requirements for relocation payments and assistance of Federally 
assisted program; assurances of availability of housing 
4631. Federal share of costs 
(a) Cost to displacing agency; eligibility 
(b) Comparable payments under other laws 
(c) Agreements prior to January 2, 1971; advancements 
4632. Administration; relocation assistance in programs receiving Federal 
financial assistance 
4633. Duties of lead agency 
(a) General provisions 
(b) Regulations and procedures 
(c) Applicability to Tennessee Valley Authority 
4634. [Repealed] 
4635. Planning and other preliminary expenses for additional housing 
4636. Payments not to be considered as income for revenue purposes or for 
eligibility for assistance under Social Security Act or other Federal 
law 
4637. [Repealed] 
4638. Transfers of surplus property 
UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICY 
4651. Uniform policy on real property acquisition practices 
4652. Buildings, structures, and improvements 
4653. Expenses incidental to transfer of title to United States 
4654. Litigation expenses 
(a) Judgment for owner or abandonment of proceedings 
(b) Payment 
(c) Claims against the United States 
4655. Requirements for uniform land acquisition policies; payments of 
expenses incidental to transfer of real property to State; payment of 
litigation expenses in certain cases 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Watershed projects under the Soil Conservation Service, 7 CFR Part 622. 
Construction and maintenance, Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR 
Part 635. 
Right of way, general, Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 710. 
Relocation assistance, Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 740. 
T^ederal assistanceTO persons drsplaced^froin^thcir^^ 
farms by governmental acquisition of real property, Secretary of Labor, 29 
CFR Part 12. 
Relocation assistance and land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 36 CFR Part 
904. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This chapter is referred to in 23 USCS § 117; 25 USCS § 640d-14; 40 USCS 
§§616, 875, 877; 42 USCS §§ 5181, 11503; 43 USCS § 1578; 49 USCS Appx 
§§ 1604, 2208. 
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42 USCS § 4638 P U B L I C H E A L T H A N D W E L F A R E 
Junkyard control and acquisition under the Federal Highway Administra-
tion, 23 CFR Part 751. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Forms: 
10A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Housing and Urban Development 
§ 39:72. 
Annotations: 
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies 
Act of 1970 (42 USCS §§ 4601-4655). 33 ALR Fed 9. 
Law Review Articles: 
Lucke, Relocation Assistance Advisory Programs: A Need for Early 
Judicial Review. 27 Administrative L Rev 17. 
The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the 
Displaced. 25 Catholic U L Rev 552. 
Roberts, Homes, Road Builders and the Courts: Highway Relocation 
and Judicial Review of Administrative Action. 46 So Cal L Rev 51. 
Leary & Turner, The Injustice of "Just Compensation*' to Fixed 
Income Recipients—Does Recent Relocation Legislation Fill the Void? 
48 Temple LQ 1. 
Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief. 57 Va L Rev 
745. 
In the Path of Progress: Federal Highway Relocation Assurances. 82 
Yale L J 373. 
UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICY 
§ 4651. Uniform policy on real property acquisition practices 
In order to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property by 
agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the 
courts, to assure consistent treatment for owners in the many Federal 
programs, and to promote public confidence in Federal land acquisition 
practices, heads of Federal agencies shall, to the greatest extent practicable, 
be guided by the following policies: 
(TJThe head of a Federal agency shall make^very^reasonable effort to 
acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation. 
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, 
and the owner or his designated representatives shall be given an 
opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the 
property, except that the head of the lead agency may prescribe a 
procedure to waive the appraisal in cases involving the acquisition by 
sale or donation of property with a low fair market value. 
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the head of the 
Federal agency concerned shall establish an amount which he believes to 
be just compensation therefor and shall make a prompt offer to acquire 
120 
RELOCATION ASSISTANCE « USCS $ 40M 
the property for the full amount so established. In no event shall such 
amount be less than the agency's approved appraisal of the fair market 
value of such property. Any decrease or increase in the fair market 
value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public 
improvement for which such property is acquired, or by the likelihood 
that the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than 
that due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the 
owner, will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the 
property. The head of the Federal agency concerned shall provide the 
owner of real property to be acquired with a written statement of, and 
summary of the basis for, the amount he established as just compensa-
tion. Where appropriate the just compensation for the real property 
acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall be separately 
stated. 
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property 
before the head of the Federal agency concerned pays the agreed 
purchase price, or deposits with the court in accordance with section 1 
of the Act of February 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421; 40 U.S.C. 258a), for the 
benefit of the owner, an amount not less than the agency's approved 
appraisal of the fair market value of such property, or the amount of the 
award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding for such prop-
erty. 
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be 
so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no person lawfully 
occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling 
(assuming a replacement dwelling as required by title II will be avail-
able), or to move his business or farm operation, without at least ninety 
days* written notice from the head of the Federal agency concerned, of 
the date by which such move is required. 
(6) If the head of a Federal agency permits an owner or tenant to 
occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or 
for a period subject to termination by the Government on short notice, 
the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair rental value of the 
property to a short-term occupier. 
(7) In no event shall the head of a Federal agency either advance the 
time of condemnation, or defer negotiations or condemnation and the 
deposit of funds in court fornthenise of the owner, or^ta^e^any^other 
action coercive in nature, in order to compel an agreement on the price 
to be paid for the property. 
(8) If any interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the 
power of eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency concerned 
shall institute formal condemnation proceedings. No Federal agency 
head shall intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal 
proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property. 
(9) If the acquisition of only a portion of a property would leave the 
owner with an uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency 
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concerned shall offer to acquire that remnant For the purposes of thi* 
Act, an uneconomic remnant is a parcel of real property in which th< 
owner is left with an interest after the partial acquisition of the owner'? 
property and which the head of the Federal agency concerned has 
determined has little or no value or utility to the owner 
(10) A person whose real property is being acquired m accordance with 
this title may, after the person has been fully informed of his nght tc 
receive just compensation for such property, donate such property, and 
part thereof, any interest therein, or any compensation paid therefor to a 
Federal agency, as such person shall determine 
(Jan 2, 1971, P L 91-646, Title III, § 301, 84 Stat 1904, Apr 2, 1987, P 
L. 100-17, Title IV, §416, 101 Stat 2 5 5 ) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"Title II", referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Jan 2, 1971, P 
L 91-646, 84 Stat 1895, which appears generally as 42 USCS §§4621 
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volumes 
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Effective date of section: 
Act Jan 2, 1971, P L 91-646, Title II, § 221(a), 84 Stat 1904, which 
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effect on the date of its enactment on Jan 2, 1971 
Amendments: 
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42 USCS §§ 4630 and 4655 are not applicable to such State Until July 
1, 1972, such sections are applicable only to the extent that such State 
is able under its laws to comply with 42 USCS §§ 4630 and 4655, and 
after July 1, 1972, such sections are completely applicable to all States 
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Acquisition of real property under federally assisted programs, 7 CFR Part 
651 
Title VI program and related statutes implementation and review procedures 
under the Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 200 
The acquisition function of the Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR 
Part 712 
Right-of-way—the property management function under the Federal High-
way Administration, 23 CFR Part 713 l 
Junkyard control and acquisition under the Federal Highway Administra-
tion, 23 CFR Part 751 
Housing and Urban Development provision of replacement housing under 
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies 
Act of 1970, 24 CFR Part 43 
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation relocation assistance and 
land acquisition under Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 36 CFR Part 904 
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6 Fed Proc L Ed, Civil Rights § 11 8 
Am Jur: 
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123, 127, 130 
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Annotations: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE, 
Trustee of the Ferrebee 
1976 Family Trust, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




ler F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on July 11 through July 14, 1989, 
and concluded on August 29, 1989. The plaint 
Commissioners of Tooele County (the "County") 
[iff, Board of County 
was represented by 
David B. Thomas; the defendant, Joseph Wiley Ferrebee 
("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A. Sclhmutz and Robert A. 
Goodman. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having received the evidence, rendered its bqnch ruling on August 
29, 1989, at the conclusion of the trial. After hearings on 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law held on January 
24 and March 15, 1990, the Court now makes tqe following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
tiOQ 4 1 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In the 1970's, the County devised a plan to 
\ Utah. 
construction of the 
[(80) acres of ground 
construct the Tooele County Airport near Erda 
2. At the time the County planned 
Tooele County Airport/ Ferrebee owned eighty 
in the area of the planned airport. 
3. The County's original Airport layouts Plan for the 
airport included approximately sixty-eight (68) acres of 
Ferrebee's eighty (80) acre parcel. Approximately twelve (12) of 
the Ferrebee acres were not included in t!(ie County's original 
plan. 
tial construction of 
condemn the remain-
4. On May 16, 1986, after the ini 
the airport, the County filed this action td 
ing forty-three (43) acres of the Ferrebee property (the "Subject 
Property"). 
5. The 1986 condemnation was a cpmplete and separate 
action from the 1975 condemnation. 
6. With respect to -tho 1986 c pndomnation—and- the 
Federal and State Relocation Acts, the County failed to act 
expeditiously to acquire the Subject Property by negotiation 
7. With respect to the provision 
State Relocation Acts, the County failed to 
it was having the Subject Property appraise^, and failed to give 
Ferrebee or his representatives an opportunity to accompany the 
County's appraisers during their inspection of the Subject 
Property. 
p of the Federal and 
notify Ferrebee that 
8. With respect to the provisions of the Federal and 
State Relocation Acts, the County failed to offer to Ferrebee the 
lowest appraisal amount for purchase of the property. 
9. With respect to the provisions! of the Federal and 
State Relocation Acts, the County failed to make a full 
disclosure to Ferrebee of information which was the basis for the 
amount used by the County in negotiations wifn Ferrebee. 
10. The comparable sales used by the County's 
appraisers, and particularly the Terracor sa[Les, were not compe-
tent adjusted comparables. 
11. The Terracor sales used by the 
involved depressed sales arising out of circumstances under which 
County1s appraisers 
by dumping a large 
y, the transactions 
Terracor was trying to get rid of its land| 
amount of land on the market. Consequent! 
constituting the Terracor sales are not competent comparable 
sales. 
12. The appraisal of Phil Cook, Flerrebee's appraiser, 
is the best estimate of the fair market value of the Subject 
Property, and is adopted by the Court as the 
the Subject Property. 
true market value of 
jraisal, the agricul-13. As set forth in the Cook appi 
tural value of the Subject Property was $52,d)00 on May 16, 1986. 
14. Ferrebee had a verbal option with Floyd Walters to 
^ >^acquire access to the Subject Property for $500 per acre. 
15. Ferrebee entered into a written option to acquire 
access to the Subject Property at a stated value of $5,000 per 
- 3 -
uOO 
125 percent of the 
acre. The Court finds that this $5,000 per ac^ re value for access 
to the Subject Property was binding on Ferrepee and, based upon 
such value, adopts a total cost to acquire access of $19,240. 
16. As indicated in the Cook appraisal, the fair market 
value of the property is enhanced by its proximity to the initial 
construction of the airport. 
17. As set forth in the Cook appraisal, the fair market 
value of the property is the base agricultural value of the land 
($52,000), less the cost of access (determined by the Court to be 
$19,240), plus an enhancement of $40,950 or 
adjusted agricultural base value for the property's proximity to 
the airport, based upon competent comparable sales of land adja-
cent to other rural airports, for a total 4air market value of 
$74,000. 
18. Ferrebee paid taxes on the Subject Property in the 
amount of $826.31 after the County took posset 
Property. 
19. The County deposited with th^ Court the sum of 
$9,004.87 at about the time of condemnation. 
20. Ferrebee expended reasonable an|d necessary costs in 
this action in the amount of $307.32. 
«sion of the Subject 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Sec. 
57-12-1, et. seq. does not apply to this case. 
- 4 -
2. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land 
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4601, et. seq. 
does not apply to this case. 
3. Ferrebee is entitled to be paid the fair market 
ted by the cost of 
le airport. The fair 
value of the Subject Property, as discount 
access and as enhanced by its proximity to thk 
market value thus calculated is $74,000. 
4. Ferrebee is entitled to a refund of taxes paid on 
the Subject Property after the County took possession in the 
amount of $826.31. 
5. Ferrebee is entitled to his reasonable and 
necessary costs in the amount of $307.32. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 78-34-9, Ferrebee is 
entitled to interest on the sum of $64,995.13 at the rate of 8 
percent per annum from May 16, 1986 to the date of entry of 
Judgment. 
7. Ferrebee is entitled to interest at the rate of 12 
percent per annum on the total amount of Judgment from the date 
of entry of Judgment thereafter. 
DATED this <?& day of April, 199(0. 
BY THE COURT: 





HOLMB ROBERTS & OWEN 
Evan A. Schmutz (#3860) 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE, 
Trustee of the Ferrebee 
197 6 Family Trust, 
Defendant. 
JrUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-86156 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, sitting without a jury, on July 11 
through July 14, 1989, and concluded on August 29, 1989. The 
plaintiff, Board of County Commissioners of Tooele County (the 
"County"), was represented by David B. Thomas; the defendant, 
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee ("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A. 
Schmutz and Robert A. Goodman. The Court, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and having received the evidence, rendered 
its bench ruling at the conclusion of trial, on August 29, 1989, 
and following several hearings, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on April 30, 1990. Beipg fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing thereforj, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant 
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee shall have judgment against plaintiff Board 
iififl-i i ft 
of County Commissioners of Tooele County a& follows: 
1. For the fair market value of t*<* Subject Property in 
the amount of $74,000; 
2. For a refund of taxes paid on dhe Subject Property in 
the amount of $826.31; 
3. For necessary costs in the amount of $307.32; 
4. For interest on the sum of $64,9^5.13 at the rate of 8% 
per annum from May 16, 1986 to the date of I the entry of judgment, 
and at the rate of 12% from the date of judgment thereafter; 
.31 at the rate of 10% 
date of the entry of 
5. For interest on the sum of $826 
per annum from July 1, 1989 until the 
judgment and at the rate of 12% per aijnum from the date of 
judgment thereafter; 
6. Each party shall bear their own costs except as 
specifically provided for herein, and thei^ own attorneys' fees. 
DATED this / f day of June, 1990. 
BY THE (tOURT: 
l o n o r a b l e Homer F . W i l k i n s o n 
' D i s t r i c t Judge 
Approved a s t o Form: 
STOKER & THOMAS 
i • it t) A 1 U 
